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ABSTRACT 
 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, signed into law by President 
Obama in 2010, health insurance coverage was expanded to 20 million previously 
uninsured people. Of these, 14.5 million were Medicaid eligible. Moral Hazard, a common 
research topic in insurance, is defined as when the private actions of an individual in a 
risk-sharing situation influence the probability of the outcome. There are two types of 
moral hazard, called ex-post moral hazard and ex-ante moral hazard. In the case of health 
insurance, ex-post moral hazard is when a health behavior changes after an individual 
becomes insured. Ex-ante moral hazard, which is what is being investigated in this paper, 
is when a behavior changes and potentially causes a health event. This paper considers 
that ex-ante moral hazard developed in the portion of the population insured by Medicaid 
following its expansion in 24 states.  A difference-in-difference model is used to compare 
these 24 states to the 18 that have not voted to expand Medicaid. There are eight states 
which are excluded from the model because the legislatures of these states voted to 
expand Medicaid after the January 1, 2014 deadline. The data came from the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System, which is maintained by the Centers for Disease Control. 
I examine the rate of seat belt use as a risky health behavior in expansion states versus 
non-expansion states to determine if there is a difference resulting from moral hazard. 
Results show that there is no decrease in seatbelt use associated with the expansion of 
Medicaid.  
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INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
 
Health insurance has become an increasingly prevalent issue in American 
society today. A major goal of President Obama’s first administration was to establish 
effectively “universal health insurance”—a country where 100% of individuals were 
covered by some form of health insurance, whether that be public or private (Jung & 
Tran, 2016). With the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
in 2010, health insurance coverage expanded to over 20 million additional people who 
were not previously covered (Jung & Tran, 2016). The expansion was enabled by 
allowing individuals to remain covered by their parent’s insurance plan until age 26, the 
development of marketplaces, prohibiting insurance companies from denying coverage 
on the basis of a pre-existing condition, not allowing insurance companies to revoke 
coverage at the time a service is required, and expanding Medicaid by enacting less 
stringent qualification requirements. Of the 20 million individuals who became covered 
because of the provisions of the ACA, 14.5 million were Medicaid eligible (Jung & Tran, 
2016; Courtemanche, Marton, Ukert, Yelowitz, & Zapata, 2017). Research suggests 
that expansions of health insurance induced by the ACA have increased insurance 
coverage rates, improved utilization and improved health. However, the ACA may 
inadvertently have negatively impacted health through moral hazard.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between health 
insurance and risky health behaviors. Historically, research into the notion of a change 
in risky behavior due to insurance coverage has been inconclusive. However, the group 
of individuals which became covered because of the Medicaid expansion have not been 
studied to see if the effects of moral hazard are apparent. As documented in Dong 
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(2013), the traditional causalities studied are the ex-post moral hazard effect of health 
insurance on the use of health care, and the selection effect of the use of health care on 
health insurance. Dong argues that the complete picture must incorporate health-related 
behaviors, and not just health insurance and propensity to use health care. Dong’s 
argument is that health insurance has a true moral hazard effect on health-related 
behaviors, and that health-related behaviors have a selection effect on health 
insurance. This selection effect is adverse selection—meaning that individuals choose 
their health insurance based on their own health behavior, and is also documented by 
Einav, Finkelstein, Ryan, Schrimpf and Cullen (2013). These health behaviors are 
usually not known to the insurer, thus creating an asymmetrical distribution of 
information.  
The true moral hazard effect described by Dong is defined by Holmstrom (1979) 
as “when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately 
taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome”, meaning that one party 
decides to take an action for which another party bears the cost of a negative outcome 
resulting from that action. In the case of health insurance, this can be interpreted as if 
one’s health insurance will pay or help pay for one’s care, one may take more risks or 
be less cautious about their behaviors because he or she knows that any negative 
health outcome will be covered (Dave & Kaestner, 2008). This is called ex-ante moral 
hazard—meaning a behavior changed after an individual became covered by health 
insurance and will be the focus of the investigation described in this paper. An example 
of ex-ante moral hazard specifically is an individual, who was previously cautious 
regarding their health because they were exposed to the negative financial 
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consequences and the loss of utility, becoming more reckless about their health after 
they become insured. In the case of the Medicaid expansion brought on by the ACA, 
which is the subject of this paper, we are interested in determining if this effect is 
apparent within the group of individuals who received Medicaid coverage as of 1 
January 2014.  
  Medicaid, which is a publicly-funded form of health insurance and was created 
under President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration, provides insurance to individuals 
who fall below a certain income level and are not otherwise covered with health 
insurance by their employer or any other source, such as family members or significant 
others. Historically, Medicaid was intended to be used primarily by low-income single 
mothers. While anyone falling below the threshold for Medicaid is qualified, the 
expansion affected mostly single, childless males. Upon passage of the ACA, called 
colloquially “Obamacare”, three of the most significant reforms to the American health 
care system since the introduction of Medicaid in 1965 took effect. The three reforms 
are first, regulations were put in place which prohibited health insurance providers to 
deny coverage to an individual based on a pre-existing condition. They are required to 
determine premiums based primarily on age. Second, an individual mandate to 
purchase insurance was established. This mandate requires all individuals to be 
covered by health insurance, whether it is through the state “exchanges” set up due to 
the law, through an employer or through Medicaid. Finally, the law raised the level at 
which individuals will no longer qualify for Medicaid (Simon, Soni & Cawley, 2017; 
Courtemanche et al., 2017).The Medicaid expansion, while not an expansion of the kind 
of coverage that is being provided, is an expansion in that more individuals will become 
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eligible for the program. The Medicaid threshold became 133 percent of the federal 
poverty level and it removed the asset test, which was an asset ceiling that an 
individual’s asset holdings could not exceed if they were to be Medicaid eligible (Jung & 
Tran, 2016; Simon et al., 2017; Courtemanche et al., 2017). 
While health insurance does not decrease the total cost of any health service, it 
does decrease the cost to the individual, which may allow them to access services more 
frequently than if they had to pay the full cost of those services on the margin. As a 
result, health insurance may make individuals healthier because accessing health 
services more frequently can make an individual healthier (Kelly & Markowitz, 2009). 
However, unnecessary or excessive visits to healthcare providers will run up costs for 
insurance providers and health care providers at a much higher rate than the individual 
accessing the services. This may make health insurance more expensive in the long 
run, resulting in some poorer people being priced out of the health care if they are 
uninsured and forcing them to obtain insurance through Medicaid (Courtemanche et al., 
2017). Rising costs of health insurance and decreasing numbers of individuals covered 
by employers created a gap in insurance coverage among people who were too wealthy 
to be previously covered by Medicaid, but were uncovered by private insurance. With 
the expansion of Medicaid in 2014, more individuals became eligible for this public 
health insurance, necessitating study of the unintended effects of this new coverage.  
In theory, the significance of moral hazard seems to be very large, but in 
practice, it has been found to be relatively insignificant and difficult to prove (Dave & 
Kaestner, 2009; Kelly & Markowitz, 2017). This is due in part to the fact that many forms 
of health insurance offer incomplete coverage. Even if a consumer is protected from the 
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monetary loss of a negative health event, such as the cost of medical expenditures and 
lost earnings, he or she will not be protected from the utility loss (Kenkel, 2000). This 
uncovered loss of utility, Kenkel argues, is enough to prevent ex-ante moral hazard from 
developing in the insured population. However, the population to which Medicaid was 
expanded under the Affordable Care Act is a population which was largely uninsured 
prior to that expansion (Dong, 2012). There is reason to believe that this group, 
comprised of low-income individuals, will have a change in behaviors because of the 
expansion because this group was unlikely to be covered by private insurance before 
the expansion. Specifically, if they were accessing health services before, they can do 
so at a much lower personal cost and if they were not accessing health services, they 
now can do so at little to no personal cost. This change in circumstance and increase in 
disposable income for some may encourage a change in behavior and the existence of 
ex-ante moral hazard, which has not been seen before.  
In developed countries, morbidity and mortality are more often the result of 
chronic health behaviors rather than infectious diseases (Cawley & Ruhm, 2011). 
Meginning and Foege (2011) estimated that in 1990, one half of the deaths in the 
United States were a result of “external modifiable risk factors”, or behaviors. These 
behaviors include, for example, smoking, obesity, alcohol use, and seat belt usage. The 
outcome of interest will be the comparison of states which did expand Medicaid to those 
which did not, while controlling for these variations in population subgroups, like race, 
ethnicity and sex. This examination will provide insight into the influence of expanded 
health insurance on the behaviors of low-income individuals, specifically into if it has 
caused an increase in risky behaviors. Cawley and Ruhm establish that there are a 
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variety of factors which can influence health outcomes, including occupation, education 
and income, among others. These individual characteristics will be controls in this 
analysis. For this investigation, the health behavior of interest will be seat belt usage. 
Not utilizing a seatbelt when riding in a car is considered a risky health behavior 
(Cawley & Ruhm, 2017), and is considered an external modifiable risk factor by 
Meginning and Foege because it is a lifestyle choice. Seatbelt usage is an appropriate 
variable with which to measure ex-ante moral hazard because it captures the rate of 
reckless driving behavior, which is associated with negative health outcomes. Motor 
vehicle accidents are a leading cause of death for adults in America. Many injuries, 
including the most severe which require the highest level of medical treatment, are the 
result of not wearing a seat belt. Wearing a seat belt does not guarantee an injury 
requiring medical attention, much like wearing a seat belt does not guarantee an injury 
free accident. However, not using a seat belt it is associated with negative health 
outcomes (McDonald, Sommers, & Fargo 2014).  
MODEL & DATA 
 
The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveilance System (BRFSS) is a telephone-based 
survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and compiled into a public-
use dataset available online through the CDC website. It is a pooled cross-sectional 
survey, with data available for all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and territories of 
the United States beginning in 1984. At the time of this paper, the latest year available 
is 2016. This study examines the years 2010 through 2016 and usually has between 
380,000 and 430,000 unique responses per year. For this time frame, there was a total 
of 2,770,687 individual observations. Additionally, this survey captures a diverse 
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representation of the population of the United States. There are respondents from 
varying income and education levels, ages, genders, and other socioeconomic factors. 
Regardless of an individual’s demographic characteristics, the survey asks respondents 
to answer a variety of questions about their health, including health behaviors, such as 
alcohol consumption, smoking, and seatbelt usage. Alcohol consumption and smoking 
are health behaviors which have been studied in great depth, while seatbelt usage has 
not been examined so carefully, and not in the context of ex-ante moral hazard.  
One would expect that if ex-ante moral hazard had developed in the Medicaid-
eligible portion of the population following the expansion of the program, the rate at 
which individuals wear seatbelts would be lower in the expansion states when 
compared to the non-expansion states. Many locales engage in extensive public health 
campaigns meant to increase the use of seatbelts. Police departments also engage in 
strict enforcement of existing laws with steep penalties, which are used to motivate 
individuals to wear a seatbelt (Hedlund, Gilbert, Ledingham, & Preusser 2008). If ex-
ante moral hazard developed, it would be despite these initiatives. 
The BRFSS includes a question about an individual’s seat belt use. The question 
from which the variable of interest is derived asks respondents to state how often they 
wear a seatbelt when they ride in a car, from “never” to “always”, and includes an option 
for those who never ride in automobiles. The calculated variable used in this 
investigation grouped respondents into two categories—those who always or nearly 
always wear seatbelts, and those who seldom or never wear seatbelts, or never ride in 
cars. 
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A difference-in-differences model is used to predict the rate of seatbelt usage for 
an individual. The advantage of utilizing this kind of model is that it allows for the use of 
a pseudo-natural experiment from observational data. Controls for education, marital 
status, and employment status in the home were included. For the controls, did not 
finish high school, married, and employed were the comparison groups for education 
level, marital status, and employment status, respectively.  
State-fixed effects and year-fixed effects were also included. The purpose of 
including the state and year fixed effects is to capture any difference in seat belt usage 
rates resulting from exogeneous factors affecting only respondents from a single state, 
or responses coming from a single year. The other control variables are socioeconomic 
factors which have an established effect on health behavior (Zimmerman, Woolf & 
Haley 2015). The model is shown below: 
Seatbelt= β(expand)+ β(post)+ β(expandpost)+ β(race)+ β(marital status)+ 
β(employment status)+ β(education)+ β(year-fixed effects)+ β(state-fixed effects)+μ+ε 
To capture the Medicaid-eligible portion of the population in the model, the 
sample was limited to individuals with a reported income of less than $25,000 and under 
the age of 65. While individuals older than age 65 may be Medicaid-eligible depending 
on the state in which they live and other individual characteristics, it is assumed for this 
paper that most of their insurance would come from Medicare, not Medicaid. 36% of all 
Medicaid spending is on dual-eligible enrollees, but 65% of this spending is long-term, 
which is not usually covered by Medicare (Young, Garfield, Musumeci, Clemans-Cope, 
& Lawton, 2013). Because these services are medically necessary, over-utilization due 
to ex-ante moral hazard would likely not develop here. Additionally, because these 
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services make up the majority of spending on dual eligible individuals, and there is no 
way to distinguish between spending on long term care and acute care, all individuals 
older than age 65 who qualify for Medicaid are excluded, as not to influence the results.  
Excluding the District of Columbia, of the 50 states, 24 had adopted the 
expansion by January 1, 2014. Refer to Appendix A for a map indicating which states 
had or not adopted the Medicaid expansion. These states will form the treatment group. 
Regardless of the actual date a state chose to adopt the Medicaid expansion, if the 
successful vote to adopt occurred before 1 January 2014, the expanded coverage 
became effective on that date. There are 8 states which adopted the expansion after 
that date (Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Alaska, Montana, Louisiana and 
Maine) which will be excluded from this analysis due to lack of sufficient post-expansion 
data. There are 18 states which did not expand Medicaid prior to January 1, 2014 and 
have not expanded since that date. These states will form the control or comparison 
group. Using these groups, the states will be compared to themselves year-to-year 
before and after the expansions, and the groups will be compared to each other before 
and after 2014. The years 2010-2013 will be used to establish the baseline for all the 
states. 2014 through 2016 will be the years for the “treatment” group of 24 states which 
did expand Medicaid. 
The literature indicates that men and women have differing attitudes towards 
risky health behaviors (Dawson, Schneider, Fletcher, & Bryden, 2007; Harris, Jenkins, & 
Glaser 2006; McDonald, Sommers, & Fargo, 2014). Having children in the home can 
also impact the health behaviors of the parents. For that reason, separate regressions 
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will be run for men and women with and without children, so that the effects of gender 
and children can be better examined.  
RESULTS 
 
For seat belt use, it is not unreasonable to assume that, without the expansion in 
Medicaid, that the trend of increasing use over time would continue in both expansion 
and non-expansion states. As established, continuing enforcement of existing laws, 
public health campaigns, and changing public sentiment would likely continue to 
influence the rate of seat belt use, regardless of the Medicaid expansion. Ex-ante moral 
hazard would be shown by a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the 
“Expandpost” variable. 
“Expand” is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if and only if the respondent 
lives in one of the 24 states which voted to expand. “Post” is a binary variable which is 
equal to one if and only if the response comes from after 2014. “Expandpost”, which is 
“Expand” * “Post”, measures the difference in seat belt use resulting from being a part of 
the treatment group.  
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The table shown below is for the variables of most significant interest. Refer to 
appendix B for the complete output. 
Table 1 Expand Post Expandpost  
Male     
Without 
Children 
-.113*** .03*** -.007  
 (.0039) (.0106) (.008) N=108,003 
R2=.0297 
With Children -.170*** .0002 -.004  
 (.0067) (.012) (.009) N=39,692 
R2=.0438 
Note: In addition to variables listed, the model included state fixed effects, year fixed effects, education, 
race, marital status, and employment status. * indicates significance at the .10 level, ** indicates 
significance at the .05 level, and *** indicates significance at the .01 level. All standard errors, listed in 
parentheses, are robust standard errors.  
 
Table 1 shows the results for Males. Column 1, corresponding to the “Expand” 
variable, shows a 17-percentage point decrease in seat belt use for males with children 
resulting from living in an Expansion state. While not investigated in this study, these 
states may have common practices regarding the enforcement of existing seatbelt laws. 
It has been indicated that the most effective way to raise seat belt use is to have high-
visibility seat belt law enforcement, as opposed to any awareness campaign spending 
or demographic characteristics of a state (Hedlund et al., 2008). The cause of the 
observed decrease here may be related to this, but should be studied further to better 
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understand the true cause. A similar but smaller in magnitude decrease of 11 
percentage points is also observed in Males without children.  
Column 2 measures the change in seat belt usage resulting from a response 
from after 2014 compared to a response from before 2014. For both males without and 
with children, there is an observed increase of 3% and .005%. While only the increase 
of 3% for males without children is statistically significant, the positive values of this 
variable indicate that seat belt use is rising over time, perhaps due to the same increase 
in enforcement over time. There is an opportunity for future study here to endeavor to 
explain this increase over time, along with the difference in seat belt use in expansion 
versus non-expansion states.  
For this study, the variable of most important interest is Expandpost. There are 
.06% and .034% decreases in seat belt use for males with and without children, 
respectively, associated with this variable. Although neither case is statistically 
significant, the negative sign of the value would indicate a moral hazard effect. 
However, given the small magnitude of the changes and their statistical insignificance, 
the conclusion must be that there is not sufficient evidence to indicate higher risky 
behavior resulting from ex-ante moral hazard, as measured by seat belt use. As 
established, there may be exogeneous factors not included here which have an 
influence on seat belt use. Awareness campaigns, while not the most effective way to 
increase usage, are common in many locales and not thought to be ineffective. 
Generally measured by spending, these campaigns were not included in the model. 
Inclusion of these in the future iterations of this design provides an opportunity to better 
explain the results shown here.  
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Table 2 Expand Post Expandpost  
Female     
Without 
Children 
-.067*** -.001 -.002  
 (.003) (.005) (.004) N=138,248 
R2=.0210 
With Children -.046*** .007 .000  
 (.002) (.005) (.004) N=98,275 
R2=.0243 
Note: In addition to variables listed, the model included state fixed effects, year fixed effects, education, 
race, marital status, and employment status. * indicates significance at the .10 level, ** indicates 
significance at the .05 level, and *** indicates significance at the .01 level. All standard errors, listed in 
parentheses, are robust standard errors.  
 
For females, there are decreases of 6.7% and 4.6% for those without children 
and with children, respectively, resulting from living in an expansion state. While the 
magnitude of these changes is smaller than magnitude of the changes for men, the 
decrease is likely resulting from the same reason as males.  
The post variable for females shows slight decrease of .01%  for those without 
children and .07% increase for those with children. Neither of these percentages are 
statistically significant from 0. Generally, this shows that seat belt use is at least 
increasing over time, although there may be no change.  
The expand post variable for females is not statistically significantly different from 
0, much like for males. However, for females with children, expand post is effectively 
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equal to 0 after rounding. This shows that there is evidence to indicate that Medicaid 
has no impact on the health behaviors of females with children.  
Overall, the results indicate that there is little evidence to suggest that low-
income individuals are engaging in riskier behavior at a higher rate in expansion states 
because of the Medicaid expansion.  
DISCUSSION 
 
Because moral hazard controls cannot be imposed on the insured individual 
covered by Medicaid, the results of this paper indicate that, on the national level, ex-
ante moral hazard is not an issue. There is evidence to suggest that there is no 
increase in risky health behavior resulting from the expansion of Medicaid.  
The significantly lower rates of seatbelt use for childless males and females in 
expansion states compared to non-expansion states is difficult to concretely explain. 
The results may have been skewed by the relatively small sample size in some states, 
but further study would be required to identify an appropriate explanation for this 
difference. Increasing seat belt use over time, which is suggested by the “post” variable, 
is an outcome which individuals will likely find positive, but further study will also be 
required here to identify the cause of this success.  
Understanding the reason why there is no evidence to indicate a moral hazard 
effect is important to policy makers as they try to understand what aspects of Medicaid 
policy have been successful. The lack of ex-ante moral hazard in this sample can be 
explained in-part by the principal-agent problem. Physicians, as agents of their patients, 
have a larger responsibility for health care costs than patients, because physicians 
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control most medical expenditures. In many cases, as a part of managed care, 
physicians are reimbursed a fixed amount per patient, called a capitation payment. This 
payment is meant to control costs, moral hazard and reduce supplier-induced demand.  
Medicaid, along with numerous other private insurance plans, uses capitation payments 
for this purpose. However, Medicaid has relatively low captiation payments compared to 
these private insurance plans. As a result, physicians are often less likely to take on 
new Medicaid patients, and, when they do, there is an incentive to provide as few 
services as possible (Decker, 2012).  With significant difficulty accessing care because 
physicians choose not to take on new Medicaid patients and, when they do, they usually 
do not prescribe large volumes of care, individuals insured by Medicaid cannot afford to 
take unnecessary risk, because accessing treatment is difficult. While ease of access 
varies by state, this would help to explain the lack of evidence of a moral hazard effect 
in this study.  
An additional explanation for the lack of evidence of moral hazard is that of the 
14.5 million new individuals covered by Medicaid, some may have been previously 
covered by private insurance. The ACA, in addition to allowing more people to join the 
program based on income, allowed individual states to improve the quality of their 
Medicaid programs, which may result in Medicaid crowd-out. If this is the case, then 
some portion of the individuals covered by Medicaid would not be new to an insurance 
plan. These individuals would likely have established behaviors that would not change 
when they switched between a low-quality private plan and a low-quality public plan. Ex-
ante moral hazard would not develop because the level of quality would be consistent 
despite the change in insurance provider. The extra income saved by not having to pay 
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for the individuals own premium, co-payment, or deductible would likely not be enough 
to induce a change in behavior because the low-quality nature of the plan they are 
leaving is likely associated with a small cost. The result would be only a small increase 
in disposable income, except in cases of catastrophic illness or injury.  
There is some evidence to indicate that, in some states, Medicaid does induce 
covered individuals to utilize more care. This is unsurprising, as one of the most 
common reasons for not accessing care is the cost associated with it. Additional factors 
include the ease of access to care, which was not addressed by the Medicaid 
expansion provision of the 2010 ACA.  The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, for 
example, showed that there was a 40% increase in emergency department visits in 
covered individuals when compared to those eligible for Medicaid who were not covered 
(Finkelstein et al 2012, Taubman et al 2014). While this would appear to be a moral 
hazard effect, it is possible that this can be explained by the relative difficulty individuals 
have accessing primary care through Medicaid. Because physicians are willing to take 
on so few new Medicaid patients, this could be explained by many patients receiving 
care through emergency departments instead of through a primary care physician. The 
capitation paid by the government to providers, usually through managed care 
organizations but sometimes directly through fee-for-service from the state, is often a 
fraction of the rate that provider would receive from a private insurance company. In 
some cases, for some services, the government payment rate may be less than the cost 
to provide the service. This may induce some primary care providers to limit the number 
of new Medicaid patients they will take, as it may be done at a net loss. With the relative 
difficulty in accessing primary care, many patients may wait until their need for medical 
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care becomes an emergency or may treat the emergency room as a primary care office, 
inefficiently overutilizing emergency care. Regardless, if any of these are the case, the 
inelastic demand for emergency medical care would result in little, if any, moral hazard. 
The expansion of Medicaid, while it increased the number of individuals who had 
insurance and could access care, did not address the structural barriers that exist to 
accessing care in the system, especially for those who are publicly insured.  This would 
help to explain the lack of evidence of ex-ante moral hazard. If patients know that the 
majority of their care is going to come only in an emergency, it is likely that they would 
not have riskier health behavior once becoming insured because of the significant loss 
of utility from being in an emergency room. The lack of evidence to indicate moral 
hazard, found in this study, would support the idea that the observed increase in 
utilization in Oregon and across the country is not the result of moral hazard.  
LIMITATIONS & FUTURE STUDY 
 
The BRFSS, while an accessible and relatively simple to use data set, has 
limitations based on the methods used to collect data. By basing the survey on 
responses from land-line and cellular telephones, the results may inadvertently exclude 
the poorest portion of the population, as these individuals may not possess these 
methods of communication at as high a rate as wealthier people. This is particularly 
problematic for this study because the focus of the investigation is the very poor.  
While most Americans ride or drive regularly in a car, but the poorest Americans 
are the most unlikely group for this to be true (Tomer, 2011). Therefore, by using seat 
belt usage to measure risky health behaviors, the poorest individuals, who would also 
be affected by the Medicaid expansion, may have been excluded because seat belt use 
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may not affect them. Furthermore, the BRFSS does not include any questions asking 
the specific source of an individual’s health insurance coverage, if any. This 
necessitates the assumption that everyone who qualifies for Medicaid is enrolled in the 
program, which is not likely to be true. The assumption was based on the reported 
income of a respondent, and because the reported income is broken down into 
categories which sometimes include both individuals who do and do not qualify for 
Medicaid, this assumption is inherently flawed.  
Additionally, there is a limited amount of data after the expansion took effect. As 
more data becomes available, the analysis should be repeated so that the effects can 
be more accurately determined. Because states are free to decide the quality and 
quantity of the Medicaid program in their state, there is no true “one size fits all” 
measurement of qualifying for the program. Ideally, this study would be repeated once 
more data becomes available for all 50 states, and would be designed in a way such 
that each states’ unique qualifications for the program were included.   
While seat belt usage may be an effective way to determine the how risky an 
individual is regarding his or her health, it may not be the best measure of moral hazard. 
The link between the consequences of wearing or not wearing a seat belt on an 
individual’s health is not as clear as the link would be for smoking or drinking behavior. 
Seatbelt use is also habitual—it may be unlikely that an individual would change this 
health behavior because they became insured. The lack of evidence for moral hazard 
could be due to the choice of the dependent variable, and not because the program is 
truly designed in a way that limits ex-ante moral hazard.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Moral hazard in Medicaid poses a significant problem for policy makers. Typical 
moral hazard controls, such as co-payments and deductibles, cannot be used in 
Medicaid because the intended recipients of the benefit are very poor, and as such are 
unlikely to be able to afford these payments. The likely result would be underutilization 
of care, which is socially undesirable in the same way that overutilization due to moral 
hazard would be socially undesirable. Medicaid is thought to improve health outcomes, 
which is something that society values.  Balancing the quality of the program with the 
need for an efficient use of public dollars is a key issue for policy makers, and avoiding 
a program which creates moral hazard by increasing risky health behavior in a way 
which makes needing treatment more likely is a key part of creating this efficiency. The 
results of this study indicate that seat belt use in low-income populations is increasing 
over time, and that there is little evidence to indicate that there is an ex-ante moral 
hazard effect resulting from the Medicaid expansion.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Map of the Current Status of the Medicaid Expansion, courtesy of the 
Kaiser 
 
 
Family Foundation 
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Appendix B: Sample Regression (Men without Children) 
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =    108,003 
                                                F(19, 41)         =          . 
                                                Prob > F          =          . 
                                                R-squared         =     0.0293 
                                                Root MSE          =     .29404 
seatbelt Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
expand -.1126786 .0038759 -29.07 0.000 -.1205061 -.1048511 
post .0265936 .009998 2.66 0.011 .0064023 .0467849 
expandpost -.0067769 .0077715 -0.87 0.388 -.0224718 .008918 
_Istatea4 .0635656 .0027888 22.79 0.000 .0579335 .0691977 
_Istatea5 .0595242 .0017741 33.55 0.000 .0559414 .063107 
_Istatea6 .1456373 .0039083 37.26 0.000 .1377444 .1535302 
_Istatea8 .0796524 .0022194 35.89 0.000 .0751702 .0841346 
_Istatea9 .1117737 .0022036 50.72 0.000 .1073235 .1162239 
_Istatea10 .1466495 .0024815 59.10 0.000 .141638 .151661 
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_Istatea12 -.0069787 .0020262 -3.44 0.001 -.0110706 -.0028867 
_Istatea13 -.0203985 .0009816 -20.78 0.000 -.0223809 -.0184162 
_Istatea15 .1397264 .0038957 35.87 0.000 .131859 .1475938 
_Istatea16 -.0658371 .0031785 -20.71 0.000 -.0722562 -.0594181 
_Istatea17 .1164988 .00273 42.67 0.000 .1109854 .1220122 
_Istatea19 .1261013 .0006692 188.43 0.000 .1247498 .1274528 
_Istatea20 -.0561063 .0022041 -25.45 0.000 -.0605576 -.0516549 
_Istatea21 .0727147 .0015112 48.12 0.000 .0696628 .0757666 
_Istatea24 .1342141 .0037067 36.21 0.000 .1267282 .1416999 
_Istatea25 -.0035511 .0014633 -2.43 0.020 -.0065063 -.0005959 
_Istatea27 .1240281 .0006944 178.62 0.000 .1226258 .1254305 
_Istatea28 -.0310193 .0017687 -17.54 0.000 -.0345912 -.0274474 
_Istatea29 -.1339456 .0019 -70.50 0.000 -.1377828 -.1301084 
_Istatea31 -.1515018 .0023475 -64.54 0.000 -.1562427 -.1467609 
_Istatea32 .0954327 .0025652 37.20 0.000 .0902521 .1006132 
_Istatea34 .1181497 .003282 36.00 0.000 .1115216 .1247778 
23 
 
_Istatea35 .1294629 .0044083 29.37 0.000 .1205601 .1383656 
_Istatea36 .1046654 .0027112 38.60 0.000 .09919 .1101407 
_Istatea37 .0305319 .0010908 27.99 0.000 .0283291 .0327348 
_Istatea39 .0295563 .001374 21.51 0.000 .0267814 .0323311 
_Istatea40 -.0125714 .0020058 -6.27 0.000 -.0166223 -.0085205 
_Istatea41 .1513114 .0013451 112.49 0.000 .148595 .1540278 
_Istatea44 .0717797 .0018958 37.86 0.000 .0679511 .0756083 
_Istatea45 .0086944 .0006018 14.45 0.000 .0074791 .0099098 
_Istatea46 -.1858925 .0028236 -65.84 0.000 -.1915949 -.1801901 
_Istatea47 -.0214432 .0018385 -11.66 0.000 -.0251561 -.0177303 
_Istatea48 .0158675 .0035842 4.43 0.000 .008629 .023106 
_Istatea49 -.0519991 .0028257 -18.40 0.000 -.0577057 -.0462926 
_Istatea50 .0435969 .000906 48.12 0.000 .0417673 .0454265 
_Istatea51 -.0465486 .0009402 -49.51 0.000 -.0484475 -.0446498 
_Istatea53 .1487252 .0014036 105.96 0.000 .1458905 .1515598 
_Istatea54 .048686 .0013846 35.16 0.000 .0458899 .0514822 
24 
 
_Istatea55 -.0759556 .0022212 -34.20 0.000 -.0804414 -.0714698 
_Istatea56 -.1482124 .0028463 -52.07 0.000 -.1539606 -.1424642 
_Iyeara2011 .0162609 .0104624 1.55 0.128 -.0048684 .0373901 
_Iyeara2012 .0129174 .0085699 1.51 0.139 -.0043897 .0302246 
_Iyeara2013 .0124172 .0105863 1.17 0.248 -.0089624 .0337967 
_Iyeara2014 -.0100759 .0073864 -1.36 0.180 -.0249931 .0048413 
_Iyeara2015 .0027875 .005393 0.52 0.608 -.0081039 .0136788 
black .0055657 .0096162 0.58 0.566 -.0138546 .0249859 
otherrace -.0032393 .007377 -0.44 0.663 -.0181374 .0116588 
multirace .0027165 .0119041 0.23 0.821 -.0213243 .0267572 
hispanic .0291738 .0085662 3.41 0.001 .011874 .0464736 
divorced -.0139387 .0049077 -2.84 0.007 -.0238499 -.0040275 
widowed .0055927 .0075849 0.74 0.465 -.0097254 .0209108 
separated -.0163073 .0066949 -2.44 0.019 -.0298279 -.0027867 
never -.0261657 .0047525 -5.51 0.000 -.0357636 -.0165678 
othermarital -.0021532 .0068607 -0.31 0.755 -.0160087 .0117022 
25 
 
hsgrad .0133827 .0053735 2.49 0.017 .0025307 .0242346 
college .0381487 .0067024 5.69 0.000 .024613 .0516844 
collegegrad .0570446 .0088675 6.43 0.000 .0391363 .0749529 
unemploy .0059527 .0042666 1.40 0.170 -.0026638 .0145692 
_cons .8830746 .0124165 71.12 0.000 .857999 .9081503 
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